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Abstract
This research examined a memory processes account of the calibration o f probability 
judgments. A multiple-trace memory model, MINERVA-DM Dougherty,
Ogden, & Gettys, 1999), was used to integrate the ecological (Brunswikian) and the 
error (Thurstonian) models of overconfidence. The model predicts that overconfidence 
should decrease both as a function of experience and as a function of encoding quality. 
Both increased experience and improved encoding quality result in lower error variance 
in the output of the model, which in turn leads to better calibration. Three experiments 
confirmed these predictions. Implications of MDM’s account of overconfidence are 
discussed.
Considerable research has been devoted to understanding the accuracy (or 
inaccuracy) of probability judgments. Most recently, this research has been dominated 
by the calibration paradigm, in which the accuracy of people’s probability judgments is 
assessed by comparing their judgments to their proportion of correct inferences. In the 
typical experiment, participants answer a series of general knowledge questions such as 
“What is the capital of Brazil? A) Sao Paulo B) Brazilia,” and then state their 
confidence in their answer. Accuracy is assessed by measuring the calibration of 
participants’ judgments. A person is said to be well calibrated if the average o f their 
confidence judgments equals their proportion of correct judgments (confidence = 
proportion correct). Miscalibration, on the other hand, is characterized as either 
overconfidence (confidence > proportion correct), or underconfidence (confidence < 
proportion correct). The typical finding in the calibration paradigm is that people are 
overconfident, giving probability judgments that exceed their proportion o f correct 
inferences (Lichtenstein, FischhofiF, & Phillips, 1982).
Despite the considerable amount o f research on the overconfidence effect, the 
locus o f overconfidence is still disputed. One theoretical account o f overconfidence, the 
Brunswikian account, suggests that it is an artifact of the experimental task. Proponents 
of the Brunswikian account (e.g., Gigerenzer, Hofifrage, & Kleinbolting, 1991; Juslin, 
1994; Juslin, Olssen, & Winman, 1997) argue that studies investigating the calibration 
of probability judgments must meet two related pre-conditions: 1) the to-be-judged 
questions need to be drawn from an ecological reference class familiar to the 
participant, and 2) the sample o f questions used should be drawn randomly firom the
reference class. The ecological reference class is a fiinction o f the environment in which 
people interact. To the extent that people have experience with an ecological reference 
class, their mental representation of that reference class will be more-or-less veridical. 
Therefore, if questions are drawn from a person’s ecological reference class, and the 
assumption of random sampling is met, participants should give judgments that are 
more-or-less well calibrated. Gigerenzer et al. argued that most studies investigating 
overconfidence have not met these two conditions. In fact, several studies now show 
that overconfidence often is reduced considerably when the ecological reference class 
and random sampling assumptions are met (see Juslin, Olsson, & Bjorkman, 1997 for a 
review; but see Brenner, Koehler, Liberman, & Tversky, 1996; and GrifBn & Tversky, 
1992; for counterexamples).
A second major theoretical account o f overconfidence is the Thurstonian, or 
random error account (Erev, Wallsten, & Budescu, 1994), which assumes that 
overconfidence results from internal cognitive processes. Specifically, the Thurstonian 
account suggests that overconfidence is the result of random error associated with the 
response process. Using a model based on signal detection theory, Erev et al. showed 
that overconfidence could be accounted for by assuming that true judgments were 
perturbed by random error. Erev et al.’s model predicted that overconfidence should 
increase as the random error associated with the response process increased. Thus, in 
contrast to the Brunswikian account, the Thurstonian account attributes the 
overconfidence effect to random noise in the cognitive system.
Whereas both the Brunswikian and Thurstonian approaches to overconfidence 
have their merits, neither approach specifies the cognitive processes that give rise to 
both good and poor calibration. The Brunswikian account posits that the locus o f the 
overconfidence effect is the result o f factors external to the decision maker: 
Overconfidence is assumed to arise from the structure o f the environment and the 
biased selection of questions on the part of the experimenter. The Thurstonian account, 
in contrast, suggests that the locus o f overconfidence is the result o f internal cognitive 
processes (i.e., response processes), but it fails to identify the precise nature o f the 
processes that lead to the random error (however see Wallsten, Bender, & Li, 1999; 
Wallsten & Gonzalez-Vallejo, 1994 for a discussion of some of these issues). Recent 
research investigating these models suggests that neither account is sufiBcient to 
account for overconfidence (Budescu, Wallsten, & Erev, 1997; Juslin et al., 1997), and 
that a combination of the Brunswikian and Thurstonian models may be necessary.
The present research examines an alternative to the above theoretical accounts 
of overconfidence that is based on a mathematical memory model, MINERVA-DM 
(MDM; Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999). MDM provides a memory processes 
model for studying overconfidence that capitalizes on both the Thurstonian idea of 
random variation, and the Brunswikian idea of ecological structure (See Bjorkman, 
1994; Juslin, Olssen, & Bjorkman, 1997; and Soil, 1996 for models similar in spirit). 
However, unlike the Thurstonian and Brunswikian models, MDM makes explicit the 
memory processes and the representational assumptions that underlie judgments of 
probability and confidence, and it makes new predictions regarding the factors that lead
to both good and poor calibration. MDM is not ofifered as a competing model of 
overconfidence, but rather as an integrative model that captures the spirit o f both the 
Thurstonian and Brunswikian approaches. The next section briefly describes MDM and 
how it incorporates both the Thurstonian and the Brunswikian assumptions. The 
description of MDM is brief; readers interested in a more thorough treatment of the 
model are referred to Dougherty et al. (1999).
Integrating the Brunswikian and Thurstonian Approaches Using MDM 
Overview o f MDM.
MDM is a modified version of Uintzman’s (1988) MTNERVA2 memory model, 
and as such, retains all o f MINERVA2’s original capabilities as a memory model. The 
primary modification to MINERVA2 is the incorporation o f a two-stage conditional 
memory retrieval process that enables the model to account for a wide array of 
judgmental phenomena, including conditional probability and fi-equency judgments, and 
several of the heuristics and biases (see Dougherty et al., 1999).
Two core properties of MDM are its assumptions about how information is 
encoded and represented in memory and its assumptions about retrieval. MDM is an 
instance-based model (Dougherty et al., 1999; see also Hintzman, 1988) and it is 
assumed that a new memory trace is encoded in memory for each experienced event. 
Encoding in MDM proceeds by creating long-term memory traces by copying an event 
vector. The event vector is a representation of the external, environmental event (for 
mathematical purposes both the event vector and the memory traces are represented as 
vectors o f+ l’s, O’s and - I ’s). An important assumption of MDM is that traces are
degraded versions of the event vector that created them. This degradation process is 
modeled by the encoding parameter Z (which varies from 0 to 1.0). With higher values 
of L, better copies of the event vector are stored in memory; with lower values of Z, 
worse copies of the event vector are stored in memory. The memory representation in 
MDM is assumed to consist of a database of instances representing the decision 
maker’s past experiences and these instances are assumed to contain the components 
necessary to model a variety of judgmental phenomena. For generality, it is assumed 
that instances contain up to three concatenated components: a hypothesis component 
(H), a data component (D), and an environmental context component (E). The H 
component represents any event about which we wish to make a judgment, the D 
component represents the information or data that are used as input for that judgment, 
and the E component can be used to represent either, or both, intra and extra- 
experimental context. Importantly, the H and D components form the basis of the 
MDM inference engine, as they enable the model to account for conditional probability 
judgments, such as P(H|D) or P(DjH), and non conditional, or base-rate, judgments 
such as P(H) and P(D).^
Retrieval proceeds by computing the similarity between a probe vector and each 
trace stored in memory using
‘ Although the environmental context component has been useful for simulating the efiect of extra- 
experimental memory traces on judgments of frequency, it has yet to be fully investigated in the 
context of conditional judgments. It will not be used in any of the simulations presented in this article.
where Pj represents feature, in the probe vector, T;, represents feature^ in trace vector 
/, and Ni is the number o f corresponding nonzero features in both the probe and trace. 
The activation for each trace. Ai, is given by cubing its similarity,
Af = S i . (2)
These cubed similarities are then summed over all traces stored in memory to give the 
overall echo intensity. I,
1=1
where M  is the total number o f instances stored in memory. It is assumed that I  is 
proportional to the judged frequency or probability for non-conditional judgments such 
asP(H ):7 «P(H).
The retrieval process for conditional probability judgments is slightly different, 
and is assumed to proceed in two stages. Imagine you are asked to judge P(H|D), for 
example, the probability that someone is a democrat (H) given that she is wealthy (D), 
P(democrat|wealthy). In this judgment, the decision maker is interested in estimating 
the frequency o f H’s in the subset o f D ’s stored in memory. Thus, the first stage o f this 
process entails delineating the subset of instances stored in memory corresponding to 
the condition, D. This is done by computing the similarity between the D portion o f the 
probe and the D portion of each trace stored in memory to determine which traces 
correspond to the particular type wanted. For example, if the condition is “wealthy,” 
then the similarity between the “wealthy” component of each trace in memory and the 
wealthy component of the probe is computed. If the similarity of the trace meets or 
exceeds the threshold criterion. Sc, it is assumed to be passed on to the second part o f
the retrieval process. However, if the similarity value is less than Sc, processing o f  that 
trace stops. Sc is a threshold parameter that determines the minimum amount of 
similarity needed for a particular trace to be placed in the activated subset. Thus, the 
first stage of the process delineates, or activates, a subset o f instances in memory on 
which the conditional probability is based.
The second stage of the process entails the assessment o f the relative fi-equency 
of traces in the delineated subset that correspond to the non-conditional part of the 
judgment. For example, in the democrats given wealthy judgment, how many traces in 
the activated subset o f wealthy people correspond to “democrats?” This is achieved by 
computing the similarity between the H component of the probe and the H  component 
of each trace in the activated subset, cubing the similarity value for each trace, and 
summing the cubed similarities across all traces in the activated subset. This gives rise 
to the conditional echo intensity, U. which is given by
^  (4)
J  __ S f ' ^ c
■‘ c  —
where AT is a count o f the number o f  traces that passed the Sc criterion value. For 
conditional probability judgments, it is assumed that h  is proportional to judged 
probability: h  «  P(H|D). Figure 1 illustrates the conditional likelihood judgment process 
in a flow chart for the judgment P(democrat|wealthy).
MDM Applied to Overconfidence.
Figure 2 presents a conceptual model o f the probability estimation process. For 
example, imagine that participants are presented with the general knowledge question: 
“Which city is larger: Los Angeles or Sacramento?” There are two ways that this
judgment can be made: 1) retrieval o f a surrogate cue that points to an answer (e.g., 
population statistics, number of sports teams), or 2) infer on the basis o f familiarity or 
echo intensity (cf. Yonelinas, 1994). MDM is used to model this second type of 
judgment process and is not applied to situations where participants can infer the 
answer on the basis of specific knowledge, or where surrogate cues are used to infer 
the answer (cf. Gigerenzer et al., 1991).^
If an answer is recalled from memory, it is assumed that the participant 
responds with the recalled answer and gives a confidence judgment o f 100%. Thus, if 
one can recall the populations o f Los Angeles and Sacramento, or can recall a cue that 
points to Los Angeles as larger than Sacramento, then it is assumed that the participant 
will choose Los Angeles with 100% confidence. However, if an answer cannot be 
recalled (with 100% certainty), it is assumed that participants probe memory with all 
alternative answers and assess the relative echo intensity or familiarity. For the above 
question, participants are assumed to probe memory with Los Angeles and 
Sacramento. I f  the relative echo intensity values are equivalent, then the participant is 
assumed to choose at random and respond with 50% certainty. If one alternative 
returns a relatively higher echo intensity, the decision rule in MDM is to choose the 
alternative with the highest echo intensity. Confidence is assumed to be proportional to 
the relative echo intensity or conditional echo intensity o f the x-altemative answers. For
 ^Although this might seem to somewhat limit MDM’s applicability, previous research indicates that 
choice behavior often can be attributed to recognition processes (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). For 
example, in one study, Goldstein (1998) found that an average of 93% of participant’s choices were 
made on the basis of recognition memory. This leaves little left to be explained by the use of surrogate 
cues.
the above question, most people will choose Los Angeles because it is the most 
familiar. Confidence is assumed to be given by: confidence = I l o .  A n g e ia / C I u ) .  
Angeiei+Isacnunento). Note that fof probabilistic tasks where the chosen answer is correct 
only with some probability, the decision maker will not be able to recall the “correct” 
answer with 100% certainty. Thus, in these situations, the decision maker will, by 
necessity, choose the answer by assessing the relative femiliarity o f the x-altemative 
answers.
There are three factors that can be modeled by MDM and that affect the 
model’s overconfidence predictions: 1) the ecological cue structure or probability, 2) 
experience, and 3) encoding. All three factors can be seen as arising from the 
interaction between the decision maker and the environment and therefore can be 
modeled by combining the Brunswikian assumptions of ecological structure with 
MDM’s assumptions of memory representation. These three factors will be discussed 
within the context of the ecological models and then related to the error model in the 
sections to follow.
Ecological Models
Ecological cue structure. The first factor that can be modeled by MDM is the 
ecological cue structure. For present purposes, the ecological cue structure is defined 
as the ratio o f traces for each answer. Ecological cue probability can be accommodated 
naturally by any instance-based model if it is assumed that people’s past experiences are 
stored in a manner similar to how they are encountered in the environment. This 
fi’equentistic memory representation enables cue probabilities to be inferred fi'om
memory by comparing relative frequencies. Let f(A) and £(B) represent the frequency 
o f traces in memory corresponding to two mutually exclusive events, A  and B. Assume 
further that the decision maker’s task is to make a comparative judgment o f some sort, 
such as “which city is larger, A or B?” The ecological cue probability that A  is the 
larger city is assumed to be given by the relative frequency (i.e., ratio) of A to B traces 
stored in memory: f(A)/[f(A)+f(B)].
Returning to the earlier example, Los Angeles is a more famous city than 
Sacramento and people probably have more traces in memory corresponding to Los 
Angeles than to Sacramento. The ratio of traces stored in memory for each alternative 
answer for this question (i.e., Los Angeles and Sacramento) directly affects the relative 
echo intensity and how often participants will choose one answer versus the other as 
correct. Assume that the ratio of Los Angeles to Sacramento traces is 5 to I (5 traces 
of Los Angeles for every 1 trace o f Sacramento), then the ecological cue probability is 
given by f(Los Angeles) / [f(Los Angeles)+f(Sacramento)] = 5 / (5+1) = .83.^
For conditional probability judgments, the ecological cue probability is assumed 
to equal the objective conditional probability. For example, imagine that the task is to 
judge the probability of diseasei given a symptom (e.g., P(diseasei|symptom)). The 
ecological cue probability can be defined as the relative frequency of diseasei 
associated with the given symptom or cue: f(diseasel|symptom)/f(symptom). Thus, the 
ecological cue probability is a valid Bayesian posterior probability. Of course, the use 
o f a symptom as a cue is just one example; the concept can be generalized to account
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for any other type o f conditional probability judgment that is generated on the basis of a 
cue or multiple cues. For example, one can think of estimating the probability that a 
city is a capital given that it has national monuments (e.g., P[capital|monuments]), or 
the probability of a capital given monuments and a large population (e.g., 
P[capital|monumentsolarge population]).
Notice that for conditional probability judgments, the ecological reference class 
is defined by the condition in the conditional judgment (e.g., by monuments in the 
P [capital I monuments] judgment). Note also that this assumption is built into MDM’s 
conditional memory retrieval mechanism as seen in Eq. 4.
Experience. MDM accounts for two aspects o f experience. The first aspect of 
experience that can be accommodated by MDM is that having to do with cognitive 
adjustment (i.e., how information is sampled fi’om, or is encountered in, the 
environment; Brunswik, 1964; Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Juslin et al., 1997). Even though 
the objective ecological cue probabilities for Los Angeles and Sacramento might be 5:1 
(i.e., Los Angeles is discussed 5 times more often than Sacramento), the extent to 
which our memory corresponds to this ratio will depend on how much experience we 
have. To the extent that we have experience in an ecological reference class, the 
memory representation of the cues in the environment will approach the true ecological 
cue probabilities. With little experience, the memory representation o f the 
environmental cues might contain considerable external sampling error (i.e., we may, by 
chance, have 7 traces o f Los Angeles and only 1 trace of Sacramento). However, as
 ^Note that this ratio (and ecological cue probability) can remain constant, yet the absolute frequencies 
change (e.g., 5:1 = 50:10). As will be elaborated shortly, MDM actually makes quite different
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one gains experience in the environment, external sampling error will decrease, and the 
memory representation will become a more accurate representation of the ecological 
cue probabilities (a result of the law o f large numbers).
The second aspect o f experience that can be accommodated by MDM is trace 
frequency. Even assuming that the internal memory representation accurately reflects 
the external ecological cue structure, experience can have an indirect, yet profound, 
impact on judgment. MDM accounts for the effect o f experience by assuming that the 
frequency o f task-relevant traces stored in memory increases with experience. Assume 
a two-alternative general knowledge question. As one gains experience in an ecological 
reference class, the frequency of traces that are similar to one another will increase. For 
example, mere experience can lead to an increase in the number of traces in memory 
corresponding to Los Angeles and to Sacramento. The effect o f increasing the number 
of traces that have a high degree of inter-trace similarity is improved calibration; 
Overconfidence will decrease as the frequency o f similar task-relevant memory traces 
increases -  this will be referred to as the trace-frequency prediction.
Previous research in decision making has found that experts in several domains 
are often better calibrated than novices (e.g., bridge, Keren, 1987; weather forecasting, 
Murphy & Winkler, 1977; accounting, Mladenovic & Simnett, 1994; Tomassini, 
Solomon, Ronmey, & Krogstad, 1982). These results are consistent with MDM’s 
trace-frequency prediction if it is assumed that these experts had more task-relevant 
instances stored in memory.
predictions in these two cases.
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Encoding or information loss. A third characteristic o f the natural environment 
that can be modeled by MDM is how well information is encoded in memory.
Although, encoding is a psychological variable, it can be viewed as being driven by 
environmental factors. Environmental events often receive differing degrees of 
attention: Interesting and important stimuli tend to draw attention while uninteresting 
or unimportant stimuli tend not to receive much attention. Assuming that attention is 
necessary for encoding (Boronat & Logan, 1997; Craik, Govoni, Naveh-Benjamin, & 
Anderson, 1996), some environmental stimuli will receive a better quality o f encoding 
than other, less interesting or less important, stimuli (e.g., Gronlund, Ohrt, Dougherty, 
Perry, & Manning, 1998).
In MDM, the quality of encoding is modeled by the encoding parameter, L, 
which determines how well information is stored in memory. The net effect of 
improved encoding quality in MDM is a reduction in overconfidence. In particular, 
MDM predicts that overconfidence will decrease under conditions that lead to high 
levels (better quality) of encoding — the encoding quality prediction.
At least one study has shown a relationship between the quality of encoding and 
calibration. Juslin, Olssen, and Winman (1996) examined how well participants’ 
judgments were calibrated for stimuli that were either central to the focus o f attention 
or peripheral to the focus o f attention. Overconfidence was lower for stimuli that were 
central to the focus of attention. Presumably this was due to a difference in how well 
the different stimuli were encoded.
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The above discussion, illustrated how MDM accommodates several aspects o f 
the ecological approach. Importantly, the assumptions built into MDM as a 
consequence o f this integration have implications both for MDM’s overconfidence 
predictions and for the understanding of the error models. In the next section I discuss 
how experience and encoding affect the random error produced in the memory retrieval 
process.
Error models.
Erev et al. (1994) showed that overconfidence could be accounted for by a 
model that assumed that true judgments were perturbed by random error. This random 
error was assumed to be generated in the response-selection phase of judgment: The 
result of momentary fluctuations in the response process (Thurstone, 1927).
Rather than arising fi'om response processes per se, random variation in MDM 
arises from how information is retrieved from memory, in particular, from the 
computations on the vectors stored in memory. One property of the Erev et al. model is 
that overconfidence decreases as error variance decreases. Interestingly, the two 
factors that lead to better calibration in MDM — experience and encoding — also lead to 
the reduction o f error variance in the model. Error variance decreases as encoding 
quality increases, the result o f computations on the vectors, and as experience 
increases, a result of the law o f large numbers. Improving encoding quality decreases 
variance because there are fewer O’s present in the memory trace, the more O’s present 
in the trace, the less similar the trace will be to the probe vector. In contrast, increasing 
experience decreases variability because there is an increase in the frequency of traces
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in memory that have a high degree o f similarity to one another. Thus, the reduction in 
error variance in this case is a direct result o f the law of large numbers Oncreasing N  
naturally reduces variability).^
The net result o f increased experience and improved encoding quality is the 
reduction o f error variance in memory retrieval, which in turn leads the model to 
choose the alternative with the highest ecological cue probability more frequently. 
Consider two cases as examples: One in which the participant has 5 traces of Los 
Angeles and 1 trace of Sacramento, and the second in which the participant has 500 
traces of Los Angeles and 100 traces of Sacramento. The variability associated with the 
first case will necessarily be higher than that associated with the second case because 
there are only 6 total traces processed at memory retrieval in the former, but 600 traces 
processed in the later. This variability in turn affects the probability that participants 
will choose the alternative with the highest ecological cue probability: The higher this 
error variance is, the greater the chance that the echo intensity will be higher for 
Sacramento. This is true even though the trace ratios (and by extension, the ecological 
cue probabilities) are equivalent. Thus, increasing the number o f traces, while keeping 
the ecological cue probability constant, should lead to an increase in proportion 
correct, but leave unaffected the mean probability judgment.
Encoding also affects the amount of error variance produced at retrieval. As 
encoding quality increases, the error resulting from the vector computations decreases 
(this is a consequence o f decreasing the number of zeros in the memory vectors).
The decrease in variability with the increase in the number of traces is contingent on the trac 
having a high degree of similarity to one another. Adding traces to memcty that arc orthogonal (i.e.,
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Again, this reduction in error variance leads the model to choose the alternative with 
the highest ecological cue probability more often. Thus, assuming that encoding is 
unbiased, increasing encoding quality should lead to an increase in proportion correct 
without affecting the mean probability judgment.
The above discussion illustrates that MDM is consistent with the Thurstonian 
account o f random variation. However, in contrast to the Thurstonian account, MDM 
specifies the locus o f the random variation and the factors that affect it. More 
importantly, MDM’s account of overconfidence shows that the Brunswikian and 
Thurstonian models can be accommodated by a single memory-processes model. By 
instantiating the factor of experience in the context of MDM, it was shown that the 
same factor that the Brunswikians argued was necessary for good calibration 
(experience within the ecological reference class from which the questions are drawn) 
also leads to less variation at memory retrieval. In addition, the present analysis makes 
the novel prediction that encoding processes are fundamental to good calibration. I  
now turn to illustrating these predictions through simulations.
Simulations and Model Predictions
Four simulations using MDM were done to simulate the effects of experience 
and encoding on the calibration of probability judgments. The purpose of these 
simulations was to demonstrate MDM’s encoding quality and experience predictions. 
The experiments presented later will provide tests of these predictions.
For each simulation, 1000 participants were simulated and Sc was arbitrarily set 
to .60. The first set of simulations examined MDM’s encoding quality predictions. In
dissimilar) to the target actually increases variability (see Gronlund & Elam, 1994).
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these simulations, the effect o f encoding was modeled by varying the encoding 
parameter: L  was set to .35 in the poor-encoding condition and .55 in the good- 
encoding condition. Eighty instances were stored in memory for each simulated 
participant. The relevant trace frequencies and the objective ecological cue probabilities 
for each H|D combination are presented in Table 1 (the numbers not in parentheses).
The second set of simulations examined MDM’s experience (i.e., trace 
frequency) predictions. This was done by varying the frequency of traces stored in 
memory across two levels. In the high-experience condition, a total o f240 traces were 
stored in memory and in the low-experience condition a total of 80 traces were stored 
in memory. The exact frequency of traces corresponding to each H|D combination are 
presented in Table 1. For example, in the low-experience condition, there are 9 traces 
of Hi and 1 trace o f Hz for Di (the corresponding frequencies for the high-experience 
condition were 27 and 3). L = .35 and Sc = .60 for both simulations.
All four o f the above simulations model a decision task in which the D’s are 
probabilistically related to the H ’s. This type o f task is comparable to a disease- 
diagnosis task in which the symptoms (the D’s) are probabilistically related to the 
diseases (the H’s). A simulation of a probabilistic task was chosen because it represents 
the more general case where the outcome variable is probabilistically related to the 
predictor variables (for comparison, in the general knowledge paradigm, the outcome 
variable can be determined with certainty) and because Experiments I and 2 used this 
type of probabilistic task.
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Figure 3 presents the results o f the simulations where encoding quality is varied 
(top panel) and where experience is varied (bottom panel). As can be seen, there was a 
clear effect o f experience and encoding on overconfidence: Overconfidence decreased 
as experience increased and as encoding quality (as modeled by Z) increased. The effect 
o f experience on overconfidence is the direct result of increasing the frequency of 
similar traces stored in memory. As the frequency of similar traces increases, the error 
variance associated with retrieval decreases and the model chooses the alternative with 
the highest ecological cue probability more often (i.e., proportion correct increases). 
Increasing encoding quality has a similar effect on overconfidence and it too is the 
result o f  a decrease in the random error. However, in this case, the random error is the 
result of individual vector computations. As encoding quality increases, the error 
produced by the individual vector computations decreases.
A second, and less obvious finding from these simulations is that MDM’s 
reduction in overconfidence is due mostly to the increase in proportion correct, as 
opposed to decreases in the predicted probability (i.e., proportion correct increased, 
but the mean predicted probabilities remained constant). This is most obviously seen by 
comparing the two lines in each of the two graphs. Notice that the mean predicted 
probability is unchanged even when encoding quality improves and when experience 
increases.^ This suggests that, at least for probabilistic tasks where the trace ratios are 
constant, MDM’s predictions are due to an increase in the proportion correct and not 
better attunement o f probability judgments.
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Experiment 1
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to test MDM’s prediction that 
overconfidence decreases as encoding quality improves. Past research on the 
overconfidence phenomenon has used the general knowledge paradigm. The general 
knowledge paradigm is the limiting case of MDM’s account of the overconfidence 
phenomenon as it represents the case where the outcome variable is deterministic: 
Either the decision maker is correct or incorrect. The more general paradigm for 
studying overconfidence is a probabilistic paradigm in which the outcome variable is 
probabilistically related to the predictor variable.
Experiments 1 and 2 used a probabilistic decision task in which participants 
studied a population of fictitious patients who were suffering from one of two diseases. 
The two diseases were probabilistically related to a set of 8 mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive symptoms. The participant’s task in Experiments 1 and 2 was to first study a 
population o f patients in which both the symptom and the disease are known, and 
second, to diagnose a new population o f patients characterized by the same symptoms 
but in which the diseases are unknown. The major advantage this task has over the 
general knowledge paradigm is that the frequency of traces, and therefore, the 
ecological cue probabilities, can be manipulated. In contrast, in the general knowledge 
paradigm, it is impossible to know a priori how much exposure participants have with a 
particular set of general knowledge questions.
* This is due to the fact that the ratio of traces remains constant across all conditions. Thus, even 
though the variance is higher when encoding quality is poor and when experience is low, the mean
predicted probability judgments remains the same.
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Method
Participants
Participants were 79 undergraduate students enrolled in lower-level psychology 
courses at the University of Oklahoma. Participants received partial course credit in 
return for their participation.
Design and Procedure
The experimental design for Experiment 1 was a 2-group between-subjects 
design with encoding quality (good, poor) as the independent variable. The 
experimental task was a disease-diagnosis task consisting of a study phase and a testing 
phase. During the study phase of the experiment, participants studied a population of 
fictitious patients, each described by a single symptom and the associated disease. 
Participants were told that they would be studying a number of such patients that had 
already been diagnosed and that they were to learn which symptoms went with which 
disease. They were also informed that all eight symptoms had the possibility of 
occurring with either disease.
Table 1 presents the disease-symptom combinations used in the study phase of 
Experiment 1, the actual fi-equency with which each disease-symptom occurred (i.e., 
the trace ratios), and the objective ecological cue probabilities. Participants in both the 
good and poor encoding quality condition studied 80 fictitious patients (the numbers in 
parentheses correspond to the frequency o f traces used in the high-experience condition 
of Experiment 2).
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Participants in both the good and the poor encoding conditions were given two 
different color drawings o f faces, each labeled with one o f  the two diseases (metalytis, 
zymosis) (cf. McKenzie, 1998). Participants in the good-encoding condition were told 
that the experiment was testing a new technique for improving memory performance 
that involved mental visualization. They were instructed to visualize mentally each 
symptom as it would appear on the patient. For example, if the symptom “red rash” 
occurred with metalytis, the participant was to mentally picture a “red rash” occurring 
on the face o f the metalytis patient. Participants in the poor-encoding condition were 
told only that they were to study each fictitious patient as it appeared and that they 
would be asked several questions later about what they had learned.
The fictitious patients were presented on the computer screen one at a time and 
in random order. Although participants were self-paced, the software ensured that each 
patient was presented on the computer screen for no less than 2.0 s. A recognition test 
was given following randomly chosen patients during the study phase to ensure that 
participants were motivated to remember the diseases and symptoms. The recognition 
test required participants to identify either the disease or the symptom of the patient 
just presented. The probability that a given patient was followed by a recognition test 
was .20.
Following the study phase was a brief (5 minute) intervening task in which 
participants completed two individual difference scales (need for cognition [Caccioppo 
& Petty, 1982], and tolerance for ambiguity [MacDonald, 1970]). These tasks served 
as distracter tasks and were not part of the experimental design.
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In the testing phase o f the experiment, participants were presented with a 
symptom (e.g., pallor) and had to choose which disease they thought was most likely 
and then estimate the conditional probability P(Disease | Symptom). The probability 
judgments were made on a half-range response scale (i.e., .50 to 1.0) by entering their 
response into the computer. Participants were instructed to be as accurate as possible 
when making their probability judgments and to “feel free to use any number between 
.50 and 1.0 that most accurately reflected the true probability.” Participants were 
instructed to base their choice of disease and their probability judgment on their 
memory for how often the symptom occurred with both diseases. Each participant 
made 6 sets of judgments (diagnosis and probability estimate) for each o f the 8 disease 
- symptom combinations resulting in 48 total sets of judgments.
Dependent measures o f accuracy
The accuracy of probability judgments can be assessed using proper scoring 
rules. One such scoring rule is the probability score (Brier, 1950; Yates, 1991). The 
probability score is a measure of the accuracy o f one’s probability judgments and is 
described by the equation;
1 ^
probability score = — y](/} -  c, )^ (5)
where N  is the total number of probability assessments, n is the i“* probability judgment, 
and Ci is the outcome index for the i*** judgment (1 if correct and 0 if incorrect). 
Therefore, the probability score is the average o f the squared differences between each 
probability judgment (r,) and the outcome index (ci). Notice that lower probability 
scores indicate better accuracy, with a score of 0.0 corresponding to perfect accuracy
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(in which case the judge assigns a probability o f 1.0 and is correct on ail judgments) 
and a score o f 1.0 corresponding to perfect inaccuracy (in which case the judge assigns 
a probability o f 1.0 and is incorrect on all judgments). Several decompositions o f the 
probability score have been proposed, but those proposed by Yates (1982) and Murphy 
(1973) are the most popular. Yates’s (1982; 1991) decomposition was used in the 
present experiments.
Yates ’ Decomposition o f the Probability Score
Yates proposed an additive decomposition consisting of 4 parts: probability 
score = knowledge + calibration in-the-large + knowledge(slope)(slope-2) + scatter. 
Each component of the decomposition reveals different aspects of the quality of 
people’s judgments
Knowledge describes the overall accuracy of the judge and is defined by the 
equation:
Knowledge = C( 1 -C) (6),
where C is the proportion of correct responses across all judgments. Again, assuming 
that the participant performs better than chance, lower knowledge scores are better, 
with 0.0 indicating perfect knowledge (i.e., the proportion o f correct responses is 1.0). 
In a two-alternative choice task (as were used in the present experiments), a knowledge 
score of .25 indicates chance performance (i.e., the proportion correct is .50).
Calibration in-the-large is a measure o f the accuracy of one’s average 
probability estimate compared to his or her mean probability judgment and is defined 
as:
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Calibration in-the-large = (C - R)^ (7),
where R  is the mean o f all probability judgments and C is defined as previously stated. 
Calibration in-the-large is best if close to 0 and poor as it deviates fi"om 0. Notice that 
calibration in-the-large does not indicate whether the judge is over- or underconfident.
The third component o f Yates’ decomposition is slope. Slope is described as 
the difference between the mean probability estimate conditionalized on correct 
responses and the mean probability estimate conditionalized on incorrect responses: 
slope = Ri - Ro (8)
where Ri is the mean probability judgment for correct responses and Ro is the mean 
probability for incorrect judgment. Ideally, the judge should assign higher probability 
judgments when he or she is correct, and lower probability judgment when he or she is 
incorrect. Thus, a higher slope indicates better ability to discriminate between correct 
and incorrect judgments.
The final component of Yates’ decomposition is scatter. Scatter is a measure of 
variability in the judges’ probability judgments conditional on whether his or her 
responses are correct or incorrect, and is defined as:
(9).
where Ni and No are the frequency of correct and incorrect responses 
respectively, and var(ri) and var(ro) are the variances conditional on correct and 
incorrect responses respectively. Thus, scatter is a weighted mean of conditional 
variances (Yates, 1991).
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A  final measure typically used to measure accuracy is the bias or 
over/underconfidence score. This is simply the difference between the overall mean 
probability judgment R and the proportion correct C: Bias = R-C. Overconfidence 
obtains when the bias score is positive and underconfidence obtains when the score is 
negative.
Results and Discussion
Figure 4 presents group calibration curves for the good- and poor-encoding 
conditions in Experiment 1. As can be seen, there was a clear effect of the encoding 
manipulation. Notice that the plot for the good-encoding condition is noticeably closer 
to the identity line than the plot for the poor-encoding condition. This pattern o f data is 
consistent with MDM’s account of overconfidence as shown in the top half o f Figure 3, 
namely that overconfidence should decrease as encoding quality improves.
Eight one-way ANOVA’s were done on the probability scores, Yates’ 
decomposition o f the probability score, the mean proportion correct, and the mean 
probability estimates. An alpha of .05 was used for all significance tests unless 
otherwise noted.
Table 2 presents the various measures of accuracy along with the F-statistics 
and the effect sizes calculated using Cohen’s d. There was a significant main effect of 
encoding on the overall probability score, knowledge, and bias, with participants in the 
good-encoding condition performing significantly better (lower scores) on all three of 
these measures. In addition, good-encoding participants had marginally significantly 
better (higher) slopes. In each of these cases, the effect sizes were moderately high.
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Importantly, the above results were driven primarily by the improvement in 
proportion correct: The mean probability score, knowledge, and bias decreased as a 
result of the increase in proportion correct. An important finding in this experiment was 
that there was no effect o f encoding on participant's probability judgments. Instead, the 
decrease in overconfidence (bias) was due solely to the increase in the proportion 
correct (i.e., participants did not adjust their probability judgments to be in line with 
their proportion correct). This is consistent with MDM’s account: That mean 
probability judgment should remain the same, but proportion correct should increase as 
encoding quality improves.
The findings o f Experiment 1 supported MDM’s encoding-quality predictions. 
Namely, overconfidence decreased as encoding quality increased. Experiment 2 tested 
MDM’s trace-frequency prediction.
Experiment 2
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to test MDM’s prediction that 
overconfidence decreases as trace frequency increases. Participants in the high- 
experience condition studied 3 times the number o f fictitious patients in the study phase 
than were studied by participants in the low-experience condition. All participants in 
Experiment 2 received the poor-encoding instructions and were not provided drawings 
of faces on which the symptoms could be mentally visualized.
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Method
Participants
Participants were 58 undergraduate students enrolled in psychology courses. 
Participants received partial course credit in return for their participation.
Design and Procedure
The experimental design was a two-group between-subjects design with 
experience (80 vs. 240 study trials) as the independent variable.
The basic experimental task was identical to that of Experiment 1 with the 
following exceptions. First, rather than manipulating encoding, all participants received 
the poor-encoding instructions from Experiment 1. Experience was manipulated by 
varying the frequency of patients presented during the study phase o f the experiment. 
Participants in the low-experience condition were presented with 80 fictitious patients 
and participants in the high-experience condition were presented with 240 fictitious 
patients. Table 1 presents the actual frequency that each disease-symptom occurred 
(the trace ratios) for both the 80 and 240 study trials conditions (the frequencies for the 
240 condition are in parentheses).
Following the study phase, participants were given a brief (5 minute) 
intermittent task that required them to solve 50 mathematical problems. This task was 
done to reduce recency effects and was not part of the experimental design.
Results and Discussion 
Due to the high degree of between-subjects variability, two outliers were 
eliminated from the sample using the trimmed mean method on the bias score (e.g.,
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participants whose bias scores were ±  2.5a from the mean were deleted). Both outliers 
were from the low-experience condition.
Figure 5 presents group calibration curves for the high- and low-experience 
conditions. There was a clear effect o f experience, with the high-experience condition 
showing much less overconfidence than the low-experience condition. This is shown 
clearly by the fact that the plot for the high-experience condition is closer to the identity 
line.
Analyses o f variance (ANOVA) were performed on the probability score, 
Yates’s decomposition, bias, mean proportion correct, and the mean probability 
judgment. Table 3 shows the results o f these analyses along with the effect-size 
calculations. There was a significant effect o f experience on the probability score, the 
knowledge score, and bias, with the high-experience condition showing better 
performance (lower scores) on all three measures. In addition, participants in the high- 
experience condition had better (higher) slope scores, though this was significant only 
at the .13 level. Similar to Experiment 1, the effect sizes for the probability score, bias, 
and knowledge were in the high range (d = .70 to .81) and the effect size for slope was 
in the medium range (d= .42). Finally, consistent with MDM’s predictions, mean 
confidence did not differ between the high and low experience conditions. Thus, the 
reduction in overconfidence was again due solely to the increase in proportion correct.
The results of Experiment 2 support MDM’s prediction that experience leads to 
decreased overconfidence and that this decrease is due to an increase in proportion 
correct. However, one question that remains unanswered by Experiments 1 and 2 is
28
whether the encoding-quality and trace-frequency predictions extend to the general 
knowledge paradigm. This question was answered in Experiment 3.
Experiment 3
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to extend the trace-frequency and encoding 
manipulations to the general knowledge task typically used in overconfidence research. 
Past research using the general knowledge paradigm has simply presented participants 
with a series of two-alternative force-choice general-knowledge questions. Each 
question is answered and confidence is assessed on a half-range (.5 to 1.0) confidence 
scale.
The methodology used in the present research was somewhat different, and 
consisted of two phases. In the first phase of the experiment, participants studied a 
subset of the general knowledge questions with their associated answers. A third of the 
total set of question/answer pairs appeared three times during the study phase and a 
third appeared only once during the study phase. The remaining one-third of the 
questions did not appear during the study phase. Thus, trace-frequency was 
manipulated across three levels; 3 ,1 , and 0 presentations. Encoding was manipulated 
by having half of the participants engage in mental visualization to improve their 
memory for the questions/answers. The remaining participants were told to read the 
questions and answers as quickly as possible.
The general knowledge questions selected for this experiment were selected to 
be of high difficulty. This was done to minimize the effect o f  participants’ prior 
knowledge. I f  participants could rely on their prior knowledge to answer the questions.
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the effectiveness o f the trace-frequency and encoding-quality manipulations would be 
minimal. The goal o f the experiment was to provide participants with the relevant 
“experience” in the study phase o f the experiment where trace frequency and encoding 
quality could be controlled.
Overconfidence should decrease both as encoding quality increased and as trace 
frequency increased for the questions studied during the study phase. In contrast to the 
previous studies where the ratio of traces was held constant across encoding and 
experience conditions, the ratios necessarily varied (because only the correct answer to 
each question was studied). Thus, while encoding and experience affected only 
proportion correct in the previous studies, they should affect both proportion correct 
and mean confidence in this experiment.
Method
Participants
Participants were 50 undergraduate students enrolled in lower-level psychology 
courses. Participants received partial course credit in return for participation.
Design and Procedure
The design of this experiment was a 2 (encoding) x 3 (trace frequency) mixed 
factorial with encoding quality (good, poor) as the between factor and trace frequency 
(3, 1,0 presentations) as the within factor.
Materials. One-hundred sixty-two general knowledge questions were selected 
as stimuli. The general knowledge questions were specifically selected to be o f very 
high difficulty, to minimize any effect o f participants’ prior knowledge of the questions.
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Procedure. The experiment consisted o f two phases. In the study phase, 
participants studied 108 dififerent general knowledge questions with the answers 
provided (e.g., “Other than the sun, which star is closer to earth? Proxima Centauri”). 
54 occurred 3 times during the study phase and 54 occurred only once, for a total of 
216 items studied during the study phase (54 x 3 + 54 x 1 = 216). Fifty-four additional 
questions were not presented in the study phase (0 presentations) but were presented in 
the testing phase. Questions were randomly assigned to each of the presentation 
conditions and were the same for all participants (i.e., questions were not randomly 
assigned for each participant). The questions were presented by computer one at a time 
in a random order, and participants were run individually on computers.
Encoding quality was manipulated by having participants engage in one of two 
orienting tasks. Participants in the poor-encoding condition were told that the 
experiment was measuring the effects of familiarity on how quickly they could read 
general knowledge questions. They were told to read the questions and answers as 
quickly as possible as they were being timed on how long it took them to read each 
question/answer.
Participants in the good-encoding condition were told that the goal of the 
experiment was to test the effectiveness of mental imagery in remembering general 
knowledge facts. Participants in the good-encoding condition were instructed to form a 
mental image containing the information in the question and the answer for each item 
that was presented during the study phase. If  they were unable to form a mental image, 
they were instructed to associate a word in the question with the given answer. It was
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emphasized that they would be tested on their memory for the answers to the questions 
at a later date and that their performance on the memory test would depend on how 
well they remembered the questions.
The testing phase o f the experiment took place four days later. Participants 
were told that they would be answering a series o f general knowledge questions and 
that many, but not all, o f the questions had appeared in the study session. The general 
knowledge test consisted of a two-alternative forced-choice test. Participants were 
presented with a question along with two alternative answers (e.g., “Other than the 
sun, which star is closer to earth? A) Proxima Centauri B) Barnard’s Star”). After 
answering each question, participants rated their confidence in their answer by 
adjusting a tick mark on a number line anchored with “50% certain” at one end and 
“100% certain” at the other end. Each participant answered a total of 162 general 
knowledge questions; 54 had occurred 3 times (3 presentations) in the study phase, 54 
had occurred 1 time (1 presentation) in the study phase, and 54 of the questions were 
new (0 presentations).
Results and Discussion
Figure 6 illustrates the calibration curves for the good- (top panel) and poor- 
encoding (bottom panel) conditions for each of the three trace-frequency conditions. 
First, note that for both encoding conditions, the plot for the 0 presentations (dashed 
line) condition is well below the identity line. This illustrates that both the good- and 
poor-encoding groups showed a large degree o f overconfidence for the questions that
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did not appear in the study phase. Thus, in the absence o f prior experience, participants 
showed the typical overconfidence result.
The two solid lines in Figure 6 plot the calibration curves for the questions that 
occurred once (open circles) and the questions that occurred 3 times (filled circles) 
during the study session. Notice that the plot for the 3-presentations condition is closer 
to the identity line than the plot for the 1-presentation condition, showing that 
participants were less overconfident for questions with which they had more prior 
experience. Finally, notice that the 3- and 1-presentation calibration plots are generally 
closer to the identity line in the good-encoding condition. This shows that 
overconfidence decreased when encoding quality increased.
Eight two-way repeated measures ANOVA’s were done to test the effects of 
experience and trace frequency on the probability score and Yates’s decomposition of 
the probability score.
Recall that main effects o f encoding and trace frequency were predicted, as was 
an encoding x trace-frequency interaction. Specifically, the good-encoding condition 
was predicted to be less overconfident than the poor-encoding condition for the 3- and 
1- presentation conditions, but not for the 0-presentation condition. In addition, 
participants were predicted to be less overconfident in the 3-presentation condition 
than in the 1-presentation condition, and less overconfident in the 1-presentation 
condition than in the 0-presentation condition.
Table 4 shows the mean probability scores and Yates’s decomposition of the 
probability score for each level o f encoding and trace-fifequency. As expected, there
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were significant main efiects o f encoding on the probability score (F[l,48] = 32.52,
Mse =  .008), bias (F[l,48] = 11.29, Mse = .021), knowledge (F[l,48] = 49.63, Mse = 
.002), slope (f%l,48] = 4.25, Mse -  .006), calibration-in-the-large (F[l,48] = 7.88, Mse 
= .002), and scatter (f{l,48] = 4.33, Mse =  .0001). In all cases, the good-encoding 
condition performed significantly better than the poor-encoding condition.
There were also significant main effects of trace-fi'equency on the probability 
score (7^2,47] = 195.37, Mse = .002), bias (7^2,47] = 67.66, Mse = .005), knowledge 
(7^2,47] = 207.76, Mse = .001), slope (7^2,47] = 37.49, Mse = .004), calibration-in- 
the-large (fT2,47] = 32.95, Mse = .001), and scatter (7^2,48] = 20.97, Mse = .00005). 
Generally, participants performed better in the 3-presentation condition than in the 1- 
presentation condition, but performed better in the 1-presentation condition than in the 
0-presentation condition.
Tests of the encoding x trace-frequency interaction revealed significant 
interactions for the probability score (F[2, 47] = 8.35, Mse =.002), knowledge (7^2,47] 
= 25.07, Mse = 001), slope (F[2, 47] = 3.38, Mse =.004), and scatter (7^2,47] = 6.66, 
Mse = .00005) and a marginally significant interaction for bias (7^2, 47] = 2.59, Mse 
=.005, p  = 08). The interaction for calibration-in-the-large-failed to reach significance 
(F[2,47]= 1.93, = 001,/? = .15).
Univariate tests of each trace-fi'equency condition, and inspection of the means 
in Table 4, revealed that the interactions were generally due to small or negligible 
differences between the good- and poor-encoding conditions for the 0-presentation 
condition relative to the 1- and 3-presentation conditions. This pattern generally held
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true for the probability score (0-presentation ^ 1,48]=2.69, AAe = .004,/? =10, 1- 
presentationf{l,48]=33.97, Mse = .005, 3-presentation/^ 1,48] = 37.33,Mse = .004), 
bias (0-presentation F[l,48]=3.35, Mse=.0l5, p  = .07, 1-presentation /^1,48]=14.35, 
AAg=.011, 3-presentation i^l,48] = Z.29, Mse=.QQ6), and knowledge (0-presentation 
f%l,48] = 0.64, Mse = .000,p  = .42, 1-presentationf{l,48] = 35.18, Mse = .002, 3- 
presentation /n^l,48] = 48.60, Mse = .002). Although the encoding x trace frequency 
interaction failed to reach significance for calibration-in-the-large, the univariate tests 
for each level of trace frequency revealed the predicted pattern. There was no 
significant effect of encoding on calibration-in-the-large for the 0-presentation 
condition (f][l,48] = 1.91, Mse = .003, /? = . 17) but significant effects for the 1- and 3- 
presentation condition (F%1,48] = 11.46, Mse = .001 and i^ l,48] = 7.27, Mse = .0004 
respectively). The lone exceptions to the predicted pattern were for slope and scatter. 
Although the interaction for slope was significant, it was apparently due solely to a 
difference between the good- and poor-encoding conditions for the 1-presentation 
condition, as there was no effect of encoding quality in the 3-presentations condition 
(0-presentation (i^l,48] = \.2A,Mse = .001,/? = .25, 1-presentation/^ 1,48] = 9.90, 
Mse = .004, and 3-presentation F[l,48] = 0.01, Mse =.008,/? = 91). For scatter, there 
were no differences between the good- and poor-encoding conditions for the 0- and 1- 
presentationcondition (0-presentationsF{1,48] =0.15,Mse = .0001, 1-presentation 
F{1,48] = 2.08, Mse = .00009). However, participants in the good-encoding group had 
significantly less scatter in the 3-presentation condition (F{1,48] = 27.01, Mse = 
.00004).
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The above results generally support MDM’s prediction that calibration should 
improve as encoding quality increases and as trace-frequency increases. For virtually all 
o f the measures o f accuracy, participants performed better as experience increased 
(from 0 to 3 presentations o f the question/answer) and when encoding quality was 
good.
There were negligible differences between the good- and poor-encoding 
conditions for the 0-presentation condition for all the dependent measures. This is 
important for two reasons. First, it indicates that there were no a priori differences 
between participants in the good- and poor-encoding conditions: Both groups were 
equally poorly calibrated for questions that did not appear in the study phase o f the 
experiment. Second, and more important, it suggests that the improvement in accuracy 
resulting from studying the question/answers was not due to metacognitive processes, 
but instead was due to the retrievability of information from memory. Had there been 
systematic differences between the good- and poor-encoding conditions for mean 
confidence in the 0-presentation condition, it would have pointed to metacognitive 
processes as a moderator of overconfidence.
It is easy to imagine how such metacognitive processes might operate in the 
context of this experiment. For example, one way to estimate one’s confidence in an 
answer is to base the judgment on the difference between the familiarity of the 
currently-being-judged answer and the average familiarity o f answers to prior 
questions. (In contrast, the assumption made by MDM is that confidence is based on 
the relative familiarity o f the two-altemative answers posed in the general knowledge
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question.) For the 0-presentation condition, the difierence between the familiarity o f the 
chosen answer and previously answered questions would be smaller in the poor- 
encoding quality condition than in the good-encoding quality condition. This is because 
the average familiarity of the 1- and 3- presentation conditions for the good-encoding 
quality condition should be higher than the average familiarity of the I- and 3- 
presentation conditions for the poor-encoding condition, relative to the 0-presentation 
questions. Thus, if participants were basing their confidence judgments on the relative 
familiarity o fpast answers, mean confidence would be lower in the good-encoding 0- 
presentation condition than in the poor-encoding 0-presentation condition. Although 
mean confidence was slightly lower in the good-encoding condition, it did not approach 
significance (p = .51). The overall improved calibration for the high-encoding condition 
and for the 1- and 3- presentation conditions cannot be attributed to this metacognitive 
process.
Conclusions
The present research has shown that overconfidence is intimately tied to how 
well information can be retrieved from memory and that it decreases as experience and 
encoding quality increase. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated the effect of encoding 
and experience on overconfidence using a probabilistic task. Overconfidence was lower 
when encoding quality was good (Experiment 1) and when experience was high 
(Experiment 2). Consistent with MDM, the reduction of overconfidence in both 
experiments was due primarily to an increase in proportion correct and not to changes 
in confidence judgments. Experiment 3 replicated the findings of Experiments 1 and 2
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using the general knowledge paradigm. In sum, all three experiments support MDM’s 
predictions that the factors o f encoding and experience are fundamental to 
overconfidence.
Implications fo r Models o f Overconfidence
Keren (1991) argued that much of the research on the overconfidence 
phenomenon lacked a coherent theoretical firamework. However, since the publication 
o f his article, two prominent and seemingly different theories have emerged. One of 
these models, the ecological or Brunswildan model (Gigerenzer et al., 1991), placed the 
locus o f overconfidence in the environment: The result of a biased selection of general 
knowledge questions on the part of the experimenter (Juslin, 1994; Juslin et al., 1997). 
The other of these models, the random error or Thurstonian model (Erev et al., 1994), 
placed the locus o f overconfidence as internal to the participant: The result of noisy 
psychological processes. Indeed, both of these models have made important 
contributions to the literature, and both have changed the way in which the 
overconfidence phenomenon is conceptualized.
Arguably the most important question generated by these models is whether 
overconfidence is real or simply an artifact (Ayton & McClelland, 1997). If the 
Brunswikians have their way, overconfidence would be considered an artifact of the 
environment: If  the assumptions of representative sampling are met, overconfidence 
disappears (Juslin, 1994). In contrast, one interpretation of the Thurstonian position 
might suggest that overconfidence is an artifact o f response error and the resulting
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regression effects (Keren, 1997).® The present research suggests that both o f  these 
accounts are simultaneously correct, yet misleading.
The Brunswikian account is correct in that overconfidence often is reduced or 
eliminated when representative sampling is used. The Thurstonian account is correct in 
that the reduction o f random error reduces overconfidence. However, both accounts 
are misleading because they ask the wrong question. The Brunswikians should ask 
“why does representative sampling reduce overconfidence?” And the Thurstonians 
should ask “what psychological variables affect random error (cf. Budescu et al., 
1997)?” The present research has provided answers to these questions. Representative 
sampling works because the questions over which participants are tested are more 
likely to be represented in memory. Random error is affected both by how well 
information is stored in memory (encoding quality) and by the amount o f experience 
the participant has in the judgment domain (trace frequencies).
On the face of it, these two models appear to be at opposing sides o f  the 
ecological versus error debate. Which theory is “correct” and what can MDM 
contribute to this debate?
The most important insight provided by MDM is that there is much more 
common ground between the Brunswikian and the Thurstonian approaches than one 
might have previously believed. The same factors in the environment that the 
Brunswikians argued were necessary for good calibration also lead to a reduction of
® In addition, the analyses by Erev et al. (1994) suggest that overconfidence might be due to how data 
are aggregated in overconfidence analyses (cf. Yates, Lee, & Bush, 1997). In reanalyzing data fiem  
several experiments, they found that the same data set can show overconfidence if the data are
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random error. Thus, contrary to previous discussions, these two accounts of 
overconfidence are not at odds, they are complementary. More importantly, MDM 
goes beyond both models by specifying the memory mechanisms responsible for both 
good and poor calibration. MDM goes beyond the ecological model o f Gigerenzer et 
al. (1991) by showing how some aspects o f the environment (i.e., cue structure and 
experience) can be instantiated in the context of a multiple-trace memory model. MDM 
also goes beyond the error model of Erev et al. (1994) by proposing that natural 
memory processes might be the source of the random error underlying judgment. 
Furthermore, the present research, and recent research by Wallsten et al. (1999), 
suggest that overconfidence is more than a data-analytic artifact o f random error in 
judgment, and that random error results fi'om fundamental psychological processes. To 
the extent that this error can be reduced through improved encoding and increased 
experience, overconfidence can be reduced.
Relation to Previous Findings
The present research and theory have several implications, both with respect to 
previous findings in decision making and with respect to debiasing overconfidence.
Hard/easy effect. A robust finding in the decision making literature is the 
hard/easy effect, whereby participants often are overconfident when answering difficult 
questions but underconfident or well calibrated when answering easy questions 
(Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977). Previously, the hard/easy effect has been explained 
away by appealing to the structure o f the environment or the biased selection o f general
aggregated conditional on confidence, and underconfidence if the data are aggregated conditional on 
the proportion correct
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knowledge questions. Gigerenzer et al. (1991) and Juslin (1994) have argued that the 
hard/easy efifect is a by-product of a biased selection of general knowledge questions. If  
the experimenter intentionally selects a difiBcult set of questions, participants will show 
overconfidence and if an easy set of questions is selected, the participant will show 
underconfidence. These same researchers also argue that if representative sampling is 
used to select the set of general knov/ledge questions (i.e., the questions are sampled 
randomly fi'om the participants’ ecological reference class ), participants will be 
relatively well calibrated.
Studies using random sampling have had varying success in eliminating the 
overconfidence efifect. Whereas several studies have demonstrated that overconfidence 
disappears with representative sampling (see Juslin, 1994), other studies have failed to 
find this effect (Brenner et al., 1996; Griffin & Tversky, 1992). Consequently, 
researchers studying overconfidence are left wondering what factors underlie the 
hard/easy efifect.
MDM’s explanation of the hard/easy efifect is somewhat more explicit than 
previous accounts and appeals to the retrievability o f items from memory. One way to 
interpret the hard-question / easy-question distinction is that domains from which hard 
questions are drawn are those in which participants have little exposure. In contrast, the 
domains from which easy questions are drawn are those in which participants have 
extensive exposure. Consequently, the answers to easy questions will be relatively more 
easily retrieved than answers to difficult questions. As the present research has shown, 
overconfidence is lower for items that are more easily retrievable (as operationalized by
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encoding quality and trace frequency). Thus, one interpretation of the hard/easy effect 
attributes the finding to memory retrieval processes. Overconfidence will obtain when 
the to-be-judged items are unlikely to be represented in memory, and good calibration 
(and possibly underconfidence) will obtain when the majority o f the items are 
represented in memory.’
One appeal o f using the retrievability of items from memory as the explanation 
of the hard/easy effect is that it can explain why some studies using representative 
sampling have found overconfidence (e.g., Brenner et al., 1996; Griffin & Tversky, 
1992). If too broad a reference class is chosen, whose items are beyond what is 
commonly experienced by the participants, overconfidence is likely to obtain. This is 
because few of the items will be represented in memory, which will in turn lead to a 
low proportion correct. If  a reference class is selected that contains items commonly 
experienced by the participants, and therefore represented in memory, then little 
overconfidence would be expected.
Validity effect. A finding related to the overconfidence effect is the validity 
effect (Hasher, Goldstein, & Toppino, 1977). The validity effect is the tendency to rate 
familiar items as more valid than unfamiliar items, regardless of whether the items are 
true (Boehm, 1994). Factors such as the number of exposures to the stimulus (Hasher 
et al., 1977) and encoding (Begg, Armour, & Kerr, 1985) have been found to increase
’ This is not to say that item difficulty  ^is not important Rather, item difficulty is often, if not always, 
confounded with whether the items are represented in memory. Perhaps one reason that representative 
sampling works is that it often results in a set of general knowledge items that has an equal mix of 
items that are represented and not represented in memory.
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judgments of validity. In essence, increasing the familiarity o f the stimulus increases 
participant’s judgments of validity.
The present findings, in particular those of Experiment 3, are consistent with 
this prior research on the validity effect. Participant’s confidence in their judgments 
generally increased as trace fi-equency increased and as encoding quality increased (cf. 
Begg et al. 1985; Hasher et al., 1977; Kelley & Lindsey, 1993). This result is also 
consistent with Dougherty et al.’s (1999) biased encoding and biased experience 
explanations of the validity effect.
Debiasing overconfidence. Another implication of the present research involves 
debiasing judgment. Previous attempts to debias overconfidence have generally been 
directed at the post-retrieval stage o f judgment (during the retrieval stage, or during the 
confidence assessment stage). For example, Arkes, Christensen, Lai, and Blumer 
(1987) found that overconfidence could be reduced by encouraging an anchoring and 
adjustment strategy. Koriat, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff (1980) were somewhat 
successful at reducing overconfidence by enticing participants to think of reasons why 
their answers might be wrong (for a review, see Arkes, 1991). In contrast to these 
previous attempts, the present research suggests that efforts to debias judgment should 
be directed at improving the initial encoding o f information and/or by providing more 
experience in the judgment domain.
In prior research, the effect of experience on calibration was operationalized in 
terms of the participant’s expertise in a domain, with little regard for the predictability 
of the task (Oskamp, 1965; Yates, McDaniel, & Brown, 1991). The present research.
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and that o f  others using the ecological approach, suggest that the structure o f the task 
is paramount to whether one will show overconfidence. In the context o f MDN^ one 
can expect calibration to improve with experience only in repetitive tasks that comprise 
essentially similar stimuli (Keren, 1991). Dynamic, and relatively unpredictable, tasks 
involving unique multi-dimensional stimuli (e.g., persons in clinical diagnosis; stocks in 
stock forecasting) do not provide the type o f learning opportunity needed for 
calibration to improve with experience (Shanteau, 1992). Thus, in these types o f tasks, 
experience actually leads to an increase in the frequency of dissimilar traces (few o f the 
stimuli are repeated). As pointed out by Gronlund & Elam (1994), increasing the 
number o f traces orthogonal to the target leads to an increase in variance at memory 
retrieval.
Obviously, improved encoding and increased experience have limited 
applicability in the real world. For example, how can one entice a person to engage in 
elaborative rehearsal strategies? Moreover, in many situations, the decision maker is 
confronted with only one chance to experience an event, as is the case when witnessing 
a crime. One way to improve calibration in these situations might be to implement 
strategies that enhance the retrievability o f information from memory. This might be 
accomplished through reinstating the encoding context or by using a cognitive- 
reconstructive technique such as the cognitive interview (Klein, Calderwood, & 
MacGregor, 1989). I know of no such study that has investigated these types of 
techniques as debiasing methods.
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Summary
The present paper has provided an account of overconfidence that is grounded 
in memory theory. In so doing, I  have shown how a multiple-trace memory model can 
be used to integrate the two major theoretical accounts of overconfidence: MDM 
simultaneously accounts for the Brunswikian notions of ecological structure and 
experience and the Thurstonian notion o f response variability. Although it might be 
tempting to conclude that overconfidence is attributable solely to memory processes, 
the theoretical account provided by MDM does not explain all overconfidence findings. 
For example, the model does not explain why there appear to be large and systematic 
cultural differences in overconfidence (Yates et al., 1997; Yates, Zhu, Ronis, Wang, 
Shinotsuka, & Toda, 1989), nor can it be readily applied to predictive judgments that 
do not rely on one’s past memory. However, despite these shortcomings, the model 
and data presented here illustrate that simple memory processes go a long way towards 
accounting for both good and poor calibration.
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Table 1. Frequency o f Traces for Each Hypothesis-Data (Disease-Symptom) 
Combination in the Low and High (in parentheses) Conditions and the Objective
Hi (Disease 1) Hz (Disease 2) P(Diseasei Symptom)
Di (Symptom 1) 9 (27) 1(3) .9
Ü2  (Symptom 2) 8(24) 2 (6 ) . 8
Ü3  (Symptom 3) 7(21) 3(9) .7
D4  (Symptom 4) 6(18) 4(12) . 6
Dj (Symptom 5) 4(12) 6(18) .4
Dg (Symptom 6 ) 3(9) 7(21) .3
D7  (Symptom 7) 2 (6 ) 8(24) . 2
Dg (Symptom 8 ) 1(3) 9(27) . 1
Total 40 (120) 40 (120)
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Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) fo r the
Probability Score and Yates’ Decomposition for Experiment 1._____
Encoding
High Low Effect F (1,78)
n=40 n=39 Size (d)
Mean Confidence .708 .694 . 2 2 0.85
(.053) (.078)
Mean % Correct .652 .578 .78 11.28**
(.107) (.087)
Probability Score .228 .261 .73 10.47**
(.044) (.046)
Knowledge .215 .236 .81 12.77**
(.032) (.016)
Bias .056 .116 .60 6.87**
( . 1 1 1 ) (.090)
Slope .032 .018 .39 2.96*
(.039) (.033)
Calibration-in-the- .015 . 0 2 1 .25 1.26
large (.019) (.028)
Scatter . 0 1 1 . 0 1 1 . 0 0 . 1 0
(.006) (.006)
* p < 1 0 , **p < . 0 1
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Table 3. The Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) o f 
the Probability Score and Yates ' Decomposition for the High and
Experience 
High Low 
n = 29 n = 27
Effect 
Size (d)
F(l, 54)
Mean Confidence .719 .717 .03 0 . 0 1
(.062) (.070)
Mean % Correct .629 .555 .76 7.95**
(.106) (.087)
Probability Score .240 .275 .70 6.62*
(.061) (.039)
Knowledge . 2 2 2 .239 .81 7.93**
(.029) (.013)
Bias .090 .162 .72 6.31*
(.1 2 1 ) (.088)
Slope .042 . 0 2 2 .42 2.36
(.043) (.050)
Calibration-in-the- . 0 2 2 .033 .33 0.45
large (.037) (.030)
Scatter .013 . 0 1 2 .16 0.50
(.006) (.006)
* p < .05, **p<.01
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Table 4. Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) o f the Probability 
Scores and Yates’s decomposition for the Good Encoding (top half) and the 
Poor Encoding Conditions (bottom half) and the Three Levels o f Trace
Good Encoding (n = 26) 0
Presentation Frequency 
1 3
Mean Confidence .740 .884 .954
(.093) (.054) (.038)
Mean % Correct .527 .820 .943
(.086) (.098) (.044)
Probability Score .314 .133 .049
(.072) (.066) (.033)
Knowledge .242 .137 .051
(.0 1 1 ) (.054) (.036)
Bias .213 .064 . 0 1 1
(.139) (.088) (.034)
Slope .024 .130 . 1 0 2
(.042) (.084) (.109)
Calibration-in-the-large .064 . 0 1 1 . 0 0 1
(.064) (.019) (.0 0 1 )
Scatter .018 .016 .005
(.0 1 1 ) (.008) (.004)
Poor Encoding (n=24)
Mean Confidence .757 .826 . 8 6 8
(.094) (.062) (.065)
Mean % Correct .479 .649 .791
(.075) ( . 1 1 2 ) ( .1 2 0 )
Probability Score .345 .253 .163
(.062) (.078) (.088)
Knowledge .244 .215 .151
(.006) (.034) (.062)
Bias .277 .176 .077
(.106) (.119) (.109)
Slope .009 .068 . 1 0 0
(.043) (.049) (.071)
Calibration-in-the-large .087 .044 .017
(.057) (.046) (.030)
Scatter .017 .019 .016
(.0 1 0 ) (.0 1 0 ) (.008)
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Schematic o f the conditional retrieval process in MDM.
Figure 2. Conceptual model o f MDM’s applicability to overconfidence.
Figure 3. MDM simulations o f the effect o f encoding (top panel) and experience 
(bottom panel) on the calibration of probability judgments. Notice that calibration is 
better when encoding quality is good (dashed line top panel) and when experience is 
high (dashed line bottom panel).
Figure 4. Effect o f encoding manipulation in Experiment 1. Dashed line illustrates the 
good-encoding condition and solid line illustrates poor-encoding condition.
Figure 5. Effect o f experience manipulation in Experiment 2. Dashed line illustrates the 
high-experience condition and solid line illustrates the low-experience condition.
Figure 6. Effect o f encoding and experience in the general-knowledge task used in 
Experiment 3.
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Figure 2
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No MDM
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Figure 4
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Figure 5
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Figure 6
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